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A STATEWIDE STANDARD OF CARE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASES-WE'RE SHOVELING SMOKE
Thomas J. Harlan,Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A month before his death, Judge Learned Hand, in an interview
with a young Life magazine reporter, was asked how he felt after
his long and illustrious career on the bench in which his opinions
were adopted by the United States Supreme Court, cited in major
law schools throughout the country, hailed as legally incisive and
brilliant, and being viewed himself as a trendsetter in legal thinking. Judge Hand replied: "'I've spent a lifetime of utter drudgery,
shoveling smoke .

. .'I

In 1977, the Virginia General Assembly first adopted a statewide
standard of care, 2 replacing what was known as the locality rule,3
in medical malpractice cases. The standard of care under the locality rule required the defendant to act as a reasonably prudent physician would act in his community or in a medically similar community. 4 The locality rule permitted expert testimony of "like
*Partner, Harlan, Knight, Dudley & Pincus, Norfolk, Virginia; B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and University of Richmond, 1953; J.D., University of Richmond, 1961.
1. Havemann, On a Great Judge's Death: A Moving Memoir, LiFE, Aug. 25, 1961, at 38.
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12:1 (repealed 1979). The statewide standard is now found in
id § 8.01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1983). The current statute provides that:
In any proceeding before a medical malpractice review panel or in any action against
a physician, dentist, nurse, hospital or other health care provider to recover damages
alleged to have been caused by medical malpractice where the acts or omissions so
complained of are alleged to have occurred in this Commonwealth, the standard of
care by which the acts or omissions are to be judged shall be that degree of skill and
diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the field of practice or
specialty in this Commonwealth and the testimony of an expert witness, otherwise
qualified, as to such standard of care, shall be admitted; provided, however, that the
standard of care in the locality or in similar localities in which the alleged act or
omission occurred shall be applied if any party shall prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the health care services and health facilities available in the locality
and the customary practices in such locality or similar localities give rise to a standard of care which is more appropriate than a Statewide standard.
Id.
3. For a discussion and history of the locality rule in Virginia, see Note, Virginia Abolishes Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 927 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
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specialists in good standing, in the same or similar localities" as
the defendant in a medical malpractice case.' It was eventually extended to cover various specialties within the medical profession.'
Under the locality rule, the plaintiff would obtain a physician familiar with the local standard of care to testify as an expert witness against the defendant physician. In the alternative, a physician from a "similar community" could testify as to his
community's standard of care, and the plaintiff would then need a
"hiatal witness" to present evidence that medical practice in the
two communities was similar.7
Concededly, it was difficult, if not impossible, to persuade physicians from the same community to testify against fellow physicians. Unless the acts were truly egregious, the physicians' reluctance to be a witness is understandable. It is conceivable that
lawyers might have the same difficulty if asked to testify against
one of their brethren in the same bar association. However, in response to the plaintiffs' lawyers' lament that the vestigial "conspiracy of silence" among doctors was aided and abetted by the locality rule, the Virginia General Assembly, enacted a statewide
standard of care. 8 Somehow, the legislature, the courts, and lawyers perceived that all physicians could be measured by such a
statewide standard.
Is this a realistic assumption? What is "that degree of skill and
diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the
field of practice or specialty in this Commonwealth... ?"9 How do
we go about measuring it? The statute does allow the defendant's
conduct in some instances to be judged against a local standard,
but places the burden upon the defendant doctor to "prove by a
5. Id. at 131, 96 S.E. at 366 (establishing the initial test for the standard of care in medical malpractice cases). See also Carroll v. Richardson, 201 Va. 157, 160-63, 110 S.E.2d 193,
195-97 (1959) (discussing instructions in applying the locality rule to expert testimony);
Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 293, 8 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1940) (holding expert testimony is
required concerning the applicable standard of care); Note, supra note 3, at 928 (discussing
the history of Virginia Supreme Court decisions on the locality rule).
6. See White v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Va. 1965) (psychiatrists); Bly v.
Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976) (gynecologists); Whitfield v. Whittaker Mem.
Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (1969) (nurse-anesthetists); Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va.
248, 6 S.E.2d 661 (1940) (dentists).
7. See Ives v. Redford, 219 Va. 838, 843, 252 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1979) (stating that the use
of an expert from a similar community does not-mean the same community in which the act
occurred).
8. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9. VA.-CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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preponderance of the evidence" that a "local standard of care" is
"more appropriate" than the statewide standard.1" Is this fair?
This article will examine the elements involved in determining a
standard of care and will conclude that a return to the locality rule
is appropriate.
II. THE

A.

STANDARD OF CARE: WHAT IS INVOLVED?

Training and Experience

To understand the elements constituting a standard of care for
medical malpractice purposes requires careful analysis. A "standard of care" connotes that a defendant physician has achieved a
certain level of training, both academically and through experience.1" Training and experience are common sense guides to evaluating a proposed standard of care. The difficulty lies in the arbitrary determination of these factors in a statewide standard. For
example, the standard for a pediatrician who has three years of
extensive training in children's illnesses theoretically should be
higher than the standard for a family physician. On the other
hand, the family practitioner who has kept abreast of pediatric
medicine and who may have twenty years of experience in dealing
with the diagnosis of children's diseases may, practically speaking,
have diagnostic skills superior to that of a newly graduated
pediatrician.
B. Diagnosis
One must acknowledge that medicine is an inexact science. 2
Medicine, in the diagnostic sense, depends greatly upon the subjective interpretation of the signs and symptoms of the patient, and
the symptoms of a particular disease may vary widely from patient
10. Id. The statute provides in part that:
[T]he standard of care in the locality or in the similar localities in which the alleged
act or omission occurred shall be applied if any party shall prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the health care services and health care facilities available in the
locality... give rise to a standard of care which is more appropriatethan a statewide standard.
Id. (emphasis added).
11. See Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 293, 8 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1940) (stating the general
proposition that medical personnel hold themselves out to the world in a capacity to furnish
skillful treatment and are liable for malpractice due to any deviation from such expertise).
12. Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 347 (4th Cir. 1982).
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to patient.13 The skills of a good diagnostician are based not only
on training and experience, but also, to a large measure, on a truly
intangible quality - intuition. Similarly, any good lawyer makes
daily judgments, particularly in the courtroom, based on intuition.
How, then, does one teach intuitive skills to another? How does
one articulate what an intuitive judgment is? It cannot be taught.
It comes to some and not to others; it can be developed but not
created; it can be relied upon but not explained. The experienced
lawyer, utilizing well-developed intuitive skills, can breathe life
into the law by creating new and imaginative solutions to stodgy
problems. In a similar sense, the skills of a medical diagnostician
are based upon the art of "intuitively" making the correct diagnosis when, in some cases, the medical facts may point the inexperienced physician in the wrong direction.
Similarly, surgery is to a great extent an art form. A surgeon's
skill depends upon his natural talent, his knowledge and his dexterity which generally become better with increased experience. No
two patients respond to surgery in the same way; mental outlook,
healing time, anatomical structure, and reaction to medicines vary
from patient to patient. In dealing with these human differences,
the surgeon, too, must rely upon certain indefinable intuitive skills
when encountering a patient who does not "quite fit the mold." 4
Therefore, if justice is to prevail, all of these variables must be understood and taken into account when assessing the conduct of a
physician.
1.

Patient History

In medicine, a correct diagnosis depends upon many factors. One
of the first and most important of these factors is the ability of a
physician to obtain an accurate history of the development of his
patient's disease. 1 5 To some extent, this is within the control of the
physician and to some extent it is within the control of the patient.
A child may be unable to describe his complaints. An unconscious
13. Id. See also Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214, 218, 156 S.E.2d 787, 790 (1967) (holding a physician is not an insurer of a cure).
14. See generally Wecht, Medical Malpractice-A Bird's-eye View, PRACTICING LAW INsTIuTE, COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 57, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 7
(Neil T. Shayne, Chm. 1973).
15. See, e.g., Godosky, Malpractice in Diagnosis, Treatment and Surgical Intervention
in Patients with Appendicitis, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No.
128, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 13-22 (Robert L. Conason, Chm. 1978).
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person would be of no assistance. An uneducated or inarticulate
patient would pose a different problem entirely.
2. Laboratory Tests
The number, quality, and type of laboratory tests available to
the physician in his community or hospital to assist him in making
a diagnosis is another factor in determining his ability to deliver
care to the patient.1" Some tests, such as a complete blood count or
an X-ray, may be available to almost every physician throughout
Virginia. On the other hand, more sophisticated processes and
tests costing large sums of money may not be available in every
community. Thus, whether or not a community has, for example, a
computerized areal tomography (CAT) scanner is significant in
evaluating a physician's conduct in relation to the information that
would be available to him in a community that does not have a
CAT scanner.
If the tests are available to a physician in Virginia, a related
question is what is the "turnaround time" that a physician can
count on. Does the laboratory remain open twenty-four hours a
day? What is the quality of the technicians who conduct the tests?
These are further factors touching on the standard of care in many
cases. These are matters that an "outsider physician" would be
hard pressed to know.
3. Cover
The concept of "cover" of one physician by another also affects
the determination of a standard of care. For example, in a group
practice of seven orthopedic surgeons, one surgeon might have
duty only one night a week due to rotation of work assignments.
Each would have the opportunity to take a vacation while being
"covered" by his partners. This practice is in contrast to that of a
community where there is only one orthopedic surgeon, or none at
all.
The solo practitioner in medicine, as well as in law, must work
harder at his craft not only in "covering" his patients, but also in
keeping abreast of new developments. In a partnership of several
physicians, information gleaned by one is usually imparted to the
16. See Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982) (concerning the physicians'
liability to a patient in reference to laboratory tests).
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group. There is also the ability to corroborate the diagnosis and
treatment of complicated cases. Of course, a solo practitioner probably has greater continuity of care by being the only physician to
see his patients every day. All of this information requires further
analysis in determining an appropriate standard of care. Indeed,
the standard may vary from group to group within a given
community.

Treatment

C.

Treatment by a physician or surgeon may be done in the office
or may require hospitalization. Treatment may consist of purely
medical treatment, surgical treatment, or a combination. A patient,
for example, may be diagnosed as having an abdominal abscess requiring surgical intervention to drain the abscess and medical
treatment thereafter with antibiotics. During the course of such
treatment, if the patient's condition should worsen, the admitting
physician may need to consult with specialists in another field.
However, consultation with a specialist may vary depending upon
the degree of specialization among the available specialists within
one community as contrasted with another. Thus, the interrelationship between the primary physician and the consulting physician in evaluating the patient's condition and deciding what course
of action to follow must be an element taken into account in defining the standard of care.
D.

Teaching versus Non-Teaching Hospitals

Whether a patient is treated in a teaching or non-teaching hospital may also affect the standard of care. If, for example, a diabetic
patient with an infection is admitted by a sole practitioner to a
teaching hospital having several residents in training on its staff,
the admitting physician takes comfort in the fact that these residents will see this patient daily and will submit reports. The
nurses also can call upon the residents, day or night, to see the
patient if necessary, and the patient may be treated by the resident for minor changes in his condition. This enables the sole practitioner to avoid unnecessary visits to the patient. However, only a
few of the hospitals in Virginia are teaching hospitals, and many
have no residents. 17 The sole practitioner in hospitals without resi17. AMRcA
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dents must rely solely upon the nursing staff, who cannot prescribe
medications, to make any reports.
Each teaching hospital has a great variety of resident specialists
on its staff. There may be cardiologists, neurologist, neuroradiological residents, cardiovascular surgical residents, otolaryngological residents, to name but a few. Thus, the hospital where a patient is placed is an element to be considered when assessing the
physician's ability to deliver a particular standard of care. In a
teaching hospital funded by state and federal sources, the medical
equipment, the medical staff, the residents, the nurses, and the
laboratory technicians may be vastly different than in the typical
non-teaching hospital. For example, laboratories in teaching hospitals are fully staffed at night; therefore, the turnaround time for a
particular set of lab tests requested might be much shorter in a
teaching hospital than in a non-teaching hospital.
Similarly, resident specialists s staff the hospital at night and are
available within minutes if a consultation in their specialty is
needed. No such resident is available in most non-teaching hospitals. At the Medical College of Virginia, for example, a highly specialized neuroradiological resident may be available in the hospital
and a neurological radiologist is on call at all times," whereas there
may not be a neurological radiologist practicing in most areas in
Virginia. As an earlier Virginia case, recognizing this difference
stated: "Due care in a lumber camp might be gross negligence at
Johns Hopkins."20
E. The Nursing Staff
Several considerations with regard to the hospital nursing staff
affect the standard of care a doctor is capable of providing. The
first consideration is whether a nursing school is attached to the
hospital. The nursing staff at a teaching hospital is numerically
greater than that at a non-teaching hospital due to the presence of
nurses in training. A larger nursing staff greatly enhances the care
provided to the patients. However, not all Virginia hospitals have a
18. Resident specialists are doctors already licensed to practice but who are taking further training in a specialty.
19. Telephone interview with Maurice Lipper, M.D., Associate Professor and Chief of
Neuroradiological Section, Medical College of Virginia, in Richmond (Aug. 10, 1984).
20. Fox v. Mason, 139 Va. 667, 671, 124 S.E. 405, 406 (1924) (standard expected depends
on the character and condition of care), rev'd on other grounds, 160 Va. 303, 168 S.E. 353
(1933). See Morgan v. Schlanger, 374 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1967).
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nursing school attached to the hospital."'
In addition, hospitals employ two types of nurses: a registered
nurse whose schooling lasts four years, and a licensed practical
nurse whose schooling lasts one year.2 2 Registered nurses, through
their extended course of study, gain a high level of expertise. Thus,
the ratio of registered nurses to licensed practical nurses in a given
hospital, day or night, influences the quality of care the physician
is able to deliver at the hospital.
Finally, the physician in a particular community becomes acquainted with certain nurses and comes to rely upon those whose
skills have been demonstrated. A physician from a different community would not be familar with the reliability and qualifications
of the nursing staff. This is another aspect to consider in evaluating a standard of care. For instance, in a given hospital, does the
surgeon have a nurse who has specialized surgical training? Is the
patient anesthetized by a nurse-anesthetist or by an
anesthesiologist?
F. Specialized Hospital Services
Several questions arise as to hospital services. Does the hospital
have an emergency room?23 Not all hospitals have emergency care.
If the hospital does have an emergency room, is it staffed with
board-certified or board-eligible emergency room physicians? Is it
staffed by residents or by interns?24
The emergency room at the Medical College of Virginia, for example, is organized around four specialty areas, each staffed, not
by family practitioners, but by specialists. The emergency room
has (a) an obstetrical and gynecological department; (b) a medical
department; (c) a surgical department; and (d) a pediatrics department.2 5 A child brought into the Medical College of Virginia's
emergency room at 2:00 a.m. will be seen by a pediatric resident or
a pediatrician, whereas in some non-teaching hospitals, the emergency room specialist is essentially a family practitioner who has
21. GUIDE, supra note 17.

22. Id.
23. For a discussion of some malpractice problems particular to an emergency care facility, see Wecht, supra note 14, at 35-36.
24. An intern is a senior medical student who is not licensed to practice medicine.
25. Telephone interview with Deborah Kelso, Nursing Coordinator of Emergency Department, Medical College of Virginia, in Richmond (June 26, 1984). The emergency room also
has a non-acute area for general practice-type problems. Id.
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branched into emergency medicine. How then can it be said that
there is a statewide standard of care for emergency room practice
unless there is a recognition that several levels of emergency room
care can be obtained in Virginia.
The same view holds for intensive care units. Does the hospital
have an intensive care unit? Does the hospital have a pediatric intensive care nursery? Some hospitals have both, some have neither.
G.

The Available Medical Community

The variety of specialists available for consultation within the
community affects the standard of care. The availability of such
specialists as nephrologists, urologists, or board-certified
neurosurgeons directly influences the quality of care that a physician is capable of providing his patient.
The availability of specialized operations also affects the standard of care. In Norfolk, for example, a micro-neurosurgical team
can replace an amputated hand, under certain conditions, in a special surgical unit. The procedure may last up to twelve hours, with
surgeons utilizing microscopes to sew severed nerves with sutures
infinitesimally finer than human hair. At the present, such a unit is
unavailable anywhere else in Virginia. Similarly, kidney transplants, heart transplants, and other specialized organ transplants
can only be done in a few cities. Thus, the availability of both specialists and equipment becomes a major issue in determining a
standard of care.
H. Individual Experience
The standard of care is also sometimes affected by individual
experience. For example, although it may be standard practice to
give a child an injection in the upper outer quadrant of his buttock, a physician experiencing a child who has suffered sciatic
nerve injury with subsequent paralysis, might very well alter his
method of giving shots and give the shot in a higher more lateral
aspect. Through discussions among local practitioners, this thinking might ultimately pervade a community. The thinking, however,
might not reach a statewide level because the particular problem
has not yet been experienced by the rest of the state. Such an analogy might be expanded so that fifty percent of the doctors in the
state are modifying the manner in which they give shots. Suppose
seventy-five percent modified the way they gave such shots, would
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the remaining twenty-five percent be considered to have automatically deviated from accepted practice? What happens if a case is
brought during the transitional period of thinking? Would it be
fair for a physician from one camp to testify against a physician in
the other for failing to adhere to the recently adopted change?

III. A

RETURN TO THE LOCALITY RULE

With all these factors in mind, how then can any one physician
take the stand and testify that he knows the statewide standard of
care? Does it not seem reasonable to require that the physician be
familiar with the capabilities of what a particular hospital can deliver in terms of services? Does it not seem reasonable to require
that the physician know various levels of specialties available in a
particular community? How can any physician generalize and say
that he knows the statewide standard of care?
As discussed earlier,2 6 a physician, surgeon, or specialist was required under the locality rule to "exercise that degree of skill, care,
knowledge, and attention ordinarily possessed and exercised by
members of the profession in his community under like circumstances . ...,, This standard was established by expert testimony.28 The expert had to "show familiarity with the degree of
skill and care employed by the ordinary, prudent practitioner" in
the relevant field and community.2 9 Whether the witness was qualified to render an opinion was left to the discretion of the trial
court.3 0 For example, in Noll v. Rahal,s the Virginia Supreme
Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by re26. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
27. Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214, 218, 156 S.E.2d 787, 790 (1967). See also Maxwell
v. McCaffrey, 219 Va. 909, 912, 252 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1979) (a witness, to qualify as a competent expert, must show familiarity with "the degree of skill and care" of a practitioner in the
relevant field and community). Cf. Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 250 S.E.2d 741 (1979)
(Fairfax physician was not qualified to testify as to standard of practice in Richmond even
though he was familiar with practice through journals, meetings, and acquaintances).
28. Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. at 218, 156 S.E.2d at 790. This method of establishing
the standard, and any breach, was originally established by the Virginia Supreme Court in
Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 131, 96 S.E. 360, 366 (1918). For a discussion of the
history of the locality rule, see Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1982);
Note, supra note 3, at 928-30.
29. Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. at 218, 156 S.E.2d at 790. See also Bly v. Rhoads, 216
Va. 645, 652, 222 S.E.2d 783, 789 (1976) (stating that the locality standard is embedded in
the history of Virginia litigation).
30. Maxwell v. McCaffrey, 219 Va. at 912, 252 S.E.2d at 344; Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. at
800, 250 S.E.2d at 744.
31. 219 -Va. 795, 250 S.E.2d 741 (1979).
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fusing to admit testimony of a Northern Virginia pediatrician concerning the incorrect diagnosis by two Richmond pediatricians of
an eleven year old boy who had contracted Rocky Mountain spotted fever.3 2 The trial court ruled that the proffered witness was not
familiar with the local standards in Richmond notwithstanding the
fact that he had practiced in Richmond for ten months.3 Similar
decisions were made concerning chiropractic practices, 34 obstetrics
and gynecology, 35 and internal medicine. 36
In 1976, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a series of statutes creating a "medical malpractice review panel" for evaluating
medical malpractice cases and rendering opinions, admissible in
court, as to whether or not a defendant doctor is guilty of malpractice. 37 The medical malpractice review panel, with some modification, could be impaneled with three local physicians to judge the
conduct of the defendant. These physicians would not only understand the local standard of care, but also, by being appointed by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, would have the approval
of the Commonwealth and the medical community to render such
an opinion. It would not only eliminate the so-called "conspiracy of
silence," but would also ensure that the defendant physician was
being judged by an appropriate standard.
Today, the plaintiff in most Virginia medical malpractice cases
must produce a medical witness to testify to the following three
points: (a) that he knows the standard of care as practiced by a
"reasonably prudent practitioner in the field of practice or specialty in this Commonwealth;"3 8 (b) that the defendant doctor
failed to comport with that statewide standard of care; and (c) that
such failure was a proximate (or the sole proximate) cause of the
plaintiff's injury.3 9 The theory behind the legislative change to a
32. Id. at 800-01, 250 S.E.2d at 743-45.
33. Id.
34. Maxwell v. McCaffrey, 219 Va. 909, 252 S.E.2d 342 (1979).
35. Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. at 653, 222 S.E.2d at 789 (Abington, Pennsylvania is not similar in practice to Prince William County).
36. Little v. Cross, 217 Va. 71, 74, 225 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1976) (ear specialist from Washington, D.C. does not know the skills and practices of the Norfolk, Va. area). See also Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d at 347-48 (relating further applications of the locality rule to
expert witnesses).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 to .20 (Repl. Vol. 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the medical review board legislation, see Harlan, Virginia'sNew Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Questions It Raises, 11 U. RICH. L. Rv.51 (1976).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8,01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
39. Id. Proximate cause, while an important factor in determining a medical malpractice
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statewide standard of care was obviously to make it easier for the
plaintiff to obtain an expert witness. However, it has led to the
creation of an artificial "statewide standard of care" which probably does not exist, but in whose existence every medical expert can
be cajoled into believing.
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the many factors involved in determining a standard of
care, it is difficult to believe that any one physician can testify that
he knows the "statewide standard of care." Reason dictates that
this physician should be familiar with the capabilities of a particular hospital in terms of services, with the training and experience
of the physicians in the community, and with the tests and equipment available in the medical community. It seems reasonable to
require that the testifying physician know the various aspects of
medical care available in a particular community.
Obviously there are certain aspects of medical care that are so
universal in their application that there may indeed be a "statewide" standard of care. But surely the mere reading of medical
journals alone cannot give the reader knowledge of the actual standard of care. Even a verbal exchange of information between members of different medical communities concerning major aspects of
care is inadequate to educate a prospective expert witness about
the totality of the medical picture in the defendant physician's
community. Indeed, the Virginia Supreme Court agreed that Judge
Hening had not abused his discretion in Noll v. Rahal40 when he
disqualified -the testimony of a pediatrician as to the standard of
care in the Richmond area. The physician, in attempting to
demonstrate that he should be permitted to testify, established
that he
(1) was a member of the Medical Society of Virginia;
(2) regularly read the Society's publication, "The Virginia
Monthly," which had articles on pediatrics;
(3) had reviewed current articles in national publications
about the disease in question (Rocky Mountain spotted fever);
claim, is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion on proximate cause, see Fitzgerald
v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341, 348-51 (4th Cir. 1982).
40. 219 Va. 795, 250 S.E.2d 741 (1979).
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(4) claimed that the national articles indicated that the
standard of medical practice for this disease seemed fairly
uniform throughout the country;
(5) had been teaching pediatrics at the Fairfax Hospital to
residents of Richmond's Medical College of Virginia;
(6) had "discourse" on pediatric medicine with the physicians in charge of the teaching program at that college; and
(7) had practiced in Virginia for ten months.41
This author submits that Judge Hening's discretion was properly
exercised and, even though we now have a supposed "statewide
standard of care," should be applicable today. Judge Hening's
analysis of the expert's ability to testify should apply where physicians from other states, or indeed from within this Commonwealth,
attempt to qualify themselves as having knowledge of a statewide
standard of care which may well be based on conjecture.
The expert witness is now dictating the outcome of many cases
in both the medical malpractice and products liability fields. 42 The
plaintiff's bar is pushing for a national standard of care so that
witnesses from all over the United States can pour into Virginia to
testify against the physician who has had an unfortunate outcome
in the care of a patient. This may represent the death knell for the
medical profession.
Being an expert witness is a lucrative business. Depending upon
his involvement, an expert can average between $4,000 and $6,000
a case. He can come in from out-of-state to supplement his medical
income. Why is this necessary? If he is retired, the witness fee
could provide a trip to Europe. But has his retirement caused him
to slip behind in his medical knowledge?
One would expect advertisements of medical doctors holding
themselves out to testify against other medical practitioners in
Trial, the magazine of the American Trial Lawyers Association.
But these doctors are even advertising their services in the Ameri41. Id. at 799, 250 S.E.2d at 743-44.
42. See Patterson, Rule-Making Power of Expert Witnesses, PartI, 23 FoR DEF. 10 (Oct.
1981) and Patterson, Rule-Making Power of Expert Witnesses, Part II, 23 FOR DEF. 11
(Nov. 1981) for a discussion of problems which can develop at trial when the expert is permitted to testify in ultimate fact language incorporating a standard which he has developed
and which may not comport with the legal standard. Although the author speaks of experts
in products liability cases, his concerns are equally applicable to medical malpractice cases.
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can Bar Association Journal. The Bar Association should have
some very real concern over this. The effect could be to drive the
cost of medical malpractice insurance beyond the reach of physicians and leave us with socialized medicine in the near future. Indeed, this type of cannibalism of the medical profession may well
set a pattern by which we lawyers may devour ourselves.
In a medical malpractice case, the trial judge may hear from the
lips of the expert that he is knowledgeable as to the statewide
standard of care in Virginia, but, this author submits, he ought to
be scrupulously careful to delve beneath this self-serving opinion
and see what the witness' opinion is based upon. It is hoped that
some of the points in this article will be the subject of careful analysis by trial judges in medical malpractice cases.

